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Abstract
Modern aircraft are complex systems with numerous interacting hardware and software
components. To minimize any safety mishaps during operations, new aircraft designs and
modifications must go through an airworthiness certification. The current United States
Air Force (USAF) airworthiness certification process, captured in MIL-HDBK-516C, is
time-consuming and manpower intensive due to extensive documentation. To minimize
inefficiencies of this document-based approach, this thesis examined model-based
systems engineering (MBSE) to support Safety Critical Function (SCF) thread analysis
against criteria found in Section 15 of MIL-HDBK-516C. Within this scope, the research
identified an SCF domain-specific profile and style guide using the Systems Modeling
Language (SysML) and domain specific extensions. The SCF profile was applied to an
Unmanned Airborne System (UAS) designed and flight tested as a course sequence in
AFIT’s Graduate school. This research identified: 1) how a system model can support the
execution of the airworthiness process, 2) how modeling can be minimally stereotyped to
support various airworthiness analyses, and where airworthiness analysis could be
automated and leaned. Using MBSE for SCF identification and thread analysis will not
only improve airworthiness certification but support the digital transformation of the
Defense acquisition system.
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USING MODEL BASED SYSTEM ENGINEERING TO IDENTIFY SAFETY
CRITICAL FUNCTIONS FOR USE IN AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATIONS

I. Introduction
1.1 Background
Modern military aircraft are complex machines with numerous interacting
systems all operating within diverse mission sets. Any improper design or operation on
the myriad of components and functions of the aircraft poses a safety risk to all personnel
who associate in and around the aircraft to include the general public. Given these
potential risks, most aircraft are subject to government-mandated safety rules that apply
to the airworthiness of the design, the production process used to make these machines,
and the operation and maintenance of individual aircraft. In the United States, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) oversees most of these certifications for aircraft and
aircraft operations. Additionally, the United States Military maintains additional
airworthiness standards, policies, and procedures in conjunction with the FAA. Any new
aircraft or new modifications on existing aircraft must be certified for airworthiness
before it is placed in operation.
Department of Defense (DoD) handbook, MIL-HDBK-516C, is used for military
aircraft airworthiness certification criteria. This document establishes the airworthiness
certification criteria, standards, and methods of compliance to be used in the
determination of the airworthiness of all manned and unmanned, fixed, and rotary wing
air systems (Department of Defense, 2014). To address each portion of the airworthiness
process, the handbook is divided into seventeen sections ranging from Systems
1

Engineering to System Safety to Computer Systems and Software etc. (Department of
Defense, 2014). Each of these main sections provide further detailed criteria necessary
for an air system to meet airworthiness certification.
MIL-HDBK-516C can be applied at any point throughout the life cycle of an air
system whenever an airworthiness determination is necessary. The handbook should
especially be used whenever there is a change to the functional or product baseline
(Department of Defense, 2014). Additionally, not all airworthiness criteria apply to every
type of air system, and platform-unique systems which contain previously undefined
criteria may need to be added. Therefore, the handbook can be tailored to create a
complete (necessary and sufficient) set of applicable airworthiness criteria, creating the
system’s certification basis (Department of Defense, 2014). From this, each aircraft
platform system program office (SPO) has the responsibility to maintain individual
records of their specific platform’s airworthiness criteria.
The organizational focus for this thesis will be Air Force Materiel Command’s
(AFMC) Air Force Lifecycle Management Center (AFLCMC) Systems Design and
Integration Branch (EZSI). AFLCMC/EZSI provides systems engineering, technical
guidance, and support to program offices to design, develop, manufacture, integrate, test,
and deploy systems to the warfighter. The branch organizes, trains, and equips AFLCMC
professionals in the following technical disciplines: Early Systems Engineering,
Development Systems Engineering, Sustainment Systems Engineering, Risk
Management, and Aircraft Stores & Armament Integration. Products and support
provided to programs offices include policy documents, implementation guides, tools,
classroom and web-based training, implementation metrics, independent reviews and
2

special project assistance. Additionally, AFLCMC/EZSI provides technical counseling,
competency and career management to engineers and security professionals across the
Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (Shouse, 2021).
Airworthiness certification follows a logical data model of the key elements used
within the airworthiness process as seen in Figure 1. Pre-contract, the process begins by
developing an airworthiness plan followed by an airworthiness impact assessment to
identify criteria that relate to or impact aircraft airworthiness. An audit is conducted on
the aircraft equipment and functions followed by a reportability determination. During
this time, requirements are developed, the modification is requested, and the certification
basis is finalized. Moving into pre-flight testing, an analysis review is conducted. Here,
airworthiness artifacts are gathered, engineering reviews are held, and criteria is checked
against FAA and Air Force Regulation documents. Sub system and ground tests are then
held, and the compliance data is collected. Upon review of the compliance data, the risks
are assessed and accepted by proper authority. This allows for a test flight release and
completion of flight test. Compliance data is once again gathered and reviewed prior to
an updated risk assessment. Once the updated risk is accepted by the proper approval
authority, the airworthiness documentation is updated, authentication is requested, and a
flight approval, Military Flight Release (MFR) or Military Type Certificate (MTC) is
awarded.

3

Figure 1. “Typical” Path to AW Approval (Airworthiness Office, 2020)
Throughout the logical data flow, the value producing operand is the
airworthiness analysis and documentation. The documentation is what defines risk,
criteria impacted, and ultimately an airworthiness certification. The process as it stands
today impacts multiple organizations with the SPO being the central hub. As aircraft
modifications come in from the operational unit, the SPO evaluates the requirement
against artifacts from the FAA, Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), Air Force
Operational and Test Command (AFOTEC), the platform contractor, and all other
military regulation offices. Pending the level of the risk as defined by the SPO
engineering team, the modification request is sent to the Chief Engineer or to AFLCMC
engineering (EN) airworthiness home office. AFLCMC/EN then evaluates the
requirements against regulations and confers with the independent technical
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airworthiness authority (TAA) and department of engineering (DOE). When modification
has been fully analyzed, the request with its associated risk is sent to the Program
Executive Officer (PEO) for acceptance and signature of the MFR/MTC. The MFR/MTC
is sent back to the SPO for program implementation and the modification is carried out
for the customer.
1.2 Problem Statement
As represented in the logical data flow and As-Is Architecture – tracking risk and
criteria is a several step complex process that impacts multiple organizations. This
complexity constrains the airworthiness certification process to be labor intensive for all
organizations involved. As it stands, to transfer information across organizations,
spreadsheets are utilized to document changes, updates, requirements, etc. With the
current document-based process, if something changes throughout the certification
process, none of the previously accomplished tasks are updated automatically or easily.
All system changes require an engineer at the SPO or home office to go back and update
all the documents manually. Additionally, spreadsheet documentation does not easily
allow for component to requirement tracing often used in the airworthiness process with
risk and hazard impact studies. To minimize inefficiencies of a document-based approach
to airworthiness certification, a different model-based process needs to be created that
emphasizes three main goals: manage system functionality, manage airworthiness
criteria, and manage airworthiness documentation.

5

1.3 Research Objective and Investigative Questions
Using Airworthiness Circular (AC) 17-01 as a guide, this thesis looked at using
model-based systems engineering (MBSE) to create a Safety Critical Function (SCF)
thread for software requirements against criteria found in Section 15 of MIL-HDBK516C. Within this scope, the research objective was to identify how a system model can
aid and automate the execution of the airworthiness process. Three specific questions
were addressed in this thesis to provide a possible solution:
1. What modeling aspects and/or program artifacts must be created to support
the airworthiness certification process?
2. What airworthiness analyses can be done with a SysML domain specific
system model?
3. How could airworthiness analysis be automated or leaned to support parallel,
continuous development operations.
1.4 Methodology Overview
Research for this thesis was completed using the Design Research Methodology
(DRM) by Lucienne T.M. Blessing and Amaresh Chakrabarti. DRM consists of four
stages: Research Clarification, Descriptive Study I, Prescriptive Study, and Descriptive
Study II. Research Clarification helps clarify the current understanding and the overall
research aim, develop a research plan, and provide focus for the subsequent stages. The
Descriptive Study I target is increasing the understanding of design and the factors that
influence its success by investigating the phenomenon of design, to inform the
development support. Prescriptive Study aims at developing support in a systematic way,
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considering the results of Descriptive Study I. Descriptive Study II focuses on evaluating
the usability and applicability of the actual support and its usefulness through a success
evaluation. Descriptive Study II was not addressed in this thesis. Although it is a part of
DRM, where a comprehensive Descriptive Study I was completed with an Initial
Prescriptive Study, a second Descriptive Study was not necessary.
1.5 Assumptions and Limitations
This thesis will be limited to MIL-HDBK-516C Section 15 Computer Systems
and Software with emphasis on SCF identification. Further research into all other
sections of MIL-HDBK-516C would be required to complete a full airworthiness
certification process. The model evaluated throughout this thesis will be of a small
unmanned aerial vehicle. This will allow for unrestricted data access and capability to
model an airframe within the time allotted. The model used was developed by a team of
students participating in the Systems Engineering Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
courses provided by AFIT.
1.6 Expected Contributions
This thesis is expected to provide insight and understanding of the use of MBSE
within the airworthiness process. Specifically, it will address the use of diagrams,
relationship tracing, and coded analysis to ease and/or automate requirements within the
computer and software portion of the airworthiness process. Work from this thesis is
expected to assist in analyzing system safety, flight hazards, and risk elements of an
aircraft system.

7

1.7 Summary
Chapter I gave a brief overview of the airworthiness certification process and the
need to overcome inefficiencies of a document-based approach. A model-based process
needs to be created that emphasizes three main goals: manage system functionality,
manage airworthiness criteria, and manage airworthiness documentation. Using MBSE,
an SCF thread for software requirements against criteria found in Section 15 of MILHDBK-516C was created for the Airworthiness Certification process.
Chapter II, Literature Review, provides benefits of MBSE over traditional
spreadsheet tracking along with examples where MBSE is being used by other industry
partners for airworthiness like certifications. Chapter III, Methodology, discusses in
depth the guiding use of DRM for this thesis and how the SCF model was created.
Chapter IV, Results and Analysis, presents a summary of the work completed to include
MBSE models for SCF identification and the interaction of the identified SCF with the
system. Finally, Chapter V will provide recommendations for future research.

8

II. Literature Review
2.1 Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to first define key terms within the airworthiness
certification. This chapter will also address the use and benefits of model-based system
engineering (MBSE) for airworthiness certification on military aircraft over traditional
spreadsheet tracking. Finally, this chapter will address the ability of using MBSE for
airworthiness certifications.
2.2 Key Terms within Airworthiness Certification
With the advent of integrated computer system architectures, reliable air system
functionality is often dependent on information technology (IT), data and the reliable
distribution of that data. Such systems include sensors, processors, software, and
communication (data buses, backplanes, radios, switches, etc). This has led to an
increased reliance on executing Safety Critical Functions (SCFs) with integrated
computer system architectures. To provide the requisite safety assurance, the USAF
airworthiness certification process has recognized that it is necessary to adhere to a
rigorous standard of safety verification for these systems, referred to as System
Processing Architectures (SPAs). The USAF airworthiness certification process utilizes
MIL-HDBK-516 Section 15, Computer Systems and Software, to establish the
airworthiness verification criteria for SPAs (Airworthiness, 2017).
An air system is an air vehicle plus the training and support systems for the air
vehicle (e.g., communications, control, ground/surface/control station, launch and
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recovery, and support elements), and any weapons to be employed on the air vehicle
(Department of Defense, 2014).
An air vehicle includes the installed equipment (hardware and software) for
airframe, propulsion, on-board vehicle and applications software,
communications/identification, navigation/guidance, central computer, fire control, data
display and controls, survivability, reconnaissance, automatic flight control, central
integrated checkout, antisubmarine warfare, armament, weapons delivery, auxiliary
equipment, and all other installed equipment (Department of Defense, 2014).
Airworthiness is the property of a particular air system configuration to safely
attain, sustain, and terminate flight in accordance with the approved usage and limits
(Department of Defense, 2014).
Airworthiness assessment is a technical evaluation of data against specific
airworthiness criteria and determination of residual risk (Airworthiness Office, 2020)
The airworthiness certification is a repeatable process implemented to verify that
a specific air system can be, or has been, safely maintained and operated within its
described flight envelope. The two necessary conditions for issuance and maintenance of
an airworthiness certification are: (1) the air system must conform to its type design; and
(2) the air system must be in a condition for safe operation (Department of Defense,
2014).
A compliance report defines the approved certification basis with references to
substantiating data that show compliance with the certification basis and lists risk levels
for non-compliant criteria. The compliance report is used for final approval of a military
type certificate (MTC) or military flight release (MFR) (Airworthiness Office, 2020).
10

The MTC provides the approval to fly a design configuration for the intended
usage up to the Service Life Limit when a design is significantly compliant with its
certification basis. This is typically only Low or Medium risks that may remain due to
non-compliance (Airworthiness Office, 2020).
The MFR provides the approval to fly specific aircraft in a design configuration
for a defined period. The MFR is awarded when a design may not meet the full standards
and/or intent of an MTC (Airworthiness Office, 2020).
The term Safety Critical Function is defined in both MIL-STD-882 and MILHDBK-516C as: a function whose failure to operate or incorrect operation will directly
result in a mishap of either Catastrophic or Critical severity. Per MIL-STD-882, SCFs are
to be identified as part of the initial activity associated with the system safety process.
Once identified, the SCFs are used in the Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA), which lays
the foundation for identifying hazards within the system. The identification of SCFs is
critical to understanding the focus area of airworthiness-oriented functionality
(Airworthiness, 2017).
Safety Critical Functions (SCFs) are defined at the weapon system or air system
level, so they are necessarily high-level functions. SCFs should be identified by the
program’s System Safety activity with support of engineers from relevant technical
discipline areas. From an airworthiness perspective, identification of SCFs is essential to
the process of verifying all functionality that contributes to airworthiness risk. The
specific set of SCFs for a given system will be unique to each platform. All criteria in
Section 15 indirectly rely on SCF identification since the criteria are only to be applied to
equipment supporting SCFs; however, there is one criterion (15.1.1) that verifies that
11

SCFs have been identified for the system. In addition to 15.1.1, there are 32 criteria
(including their associated standards) that directly reference or per definition (i.e., make
reference to SSEs or flight critical functionality) rely on SCFs being identified in order to
properly perform the verification (Airworthiness, 2017).
SCFs are grouped into five categories titled: Flight Critical, Operation Critical,
Emergency Critical, Indication Critical, and Avoidance Critical. The only purpose for the
five categories is to help convey the variety of functions that can be identified as SCFs.
Below are descriptions for each of the categories (Airworthiness, 2017):
1. Flight Critical functions are functions used to achieve and control flight (loss
or degradation could directly lead to loss of aircraft).
2. Operation Critical are SCFs that are used for supporting a non-Flight Critical
function that has inherent safety functionality associated with its operation
(loss/degradation could directly lead to a consequence of Catastrophic or
Critical hazard severity).
3. Indication Critical are SCFs needed to provide indications to pilot/crew
necessary for maintaining safe operation.
4. Emergency Critical are SCFs that exist purely for the purpose of mitigating
risk associated with emergency conditions.
5. Avoidance Critical are SCFs needed purely to mitigate a potential safety risk.
An SCF thread is defined in MIL-HDBK-516C as: the combination of
elements/components within a system and the required interfacing and interaction of
those elements/components whose overall contribution is necessary for the operation of a
given SCF. A Safety Critical Function Thread Analysis’s (SCFTA) purpose is to:
12

1. Identify all the elements, hardware and software components, and interfaces
that are necessary for the safe execution of all identified SCFs,
2. Ensure the identified elements and components are developed at Computer
System Integrity Levels (CSILs) appropriate for SCF applications, and that
safety critical interfaces are identified as such, and
3. Verify that end-to-end Validation and Verification (V&V) coverage is
achieved by the tests used to verify the SCF functionality (includes:
component level test and review; subsystem level test; through system
integration test) (Airworthiness, 2017).
2.3 Benefits of MBSE over Spreadsheet Tracking
In May 2016, Tucson Embedded Systems presented a paper titled NextGeneration Model-Based Systems Engineering Processes and Tools Supporting the
Airworthiness efforts of Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) in which they described how the
Government and Industry Program Managers need improved end-to-end model-based
(MB) tools to assist with the management of these complex development efforts, while
airworthiness authorities need clarity of how MB tools and processes are available to
support their airworthiness efforts. It is understood that airworthiness qualification
practices are notoriously burdened, and existing tools used to develop and verify complex
cyber physical systems do not provide insight into progress toward completion. These
practices leave Program Managers without proper data to manage progress and efforts
(Simi, Mulholland, & Merritt, 2016).
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Utilizing a spreadsheet-based tool requires engineers at the SPO to manually input
the data into each criterion identified by MIL-HDBK-516C. By keeping the requirements
on Excel sheets, while it is informative, the spreadsheets do not provide staff with the
effective connection between the requirement and its use in the system, or where the
requirements stem from (Carros, 2019). Furthermore, issues are compounded by the
document-centric nature of the certification process as the rules, requirements, and means
of compliance are contained within documents that must be extracted by the reader and
manually adapted into a document-based certification plan (Bleu-Laine, Bendarkar, Xie,
& Mavris, 2019). This manual update throughout the airworthiness process is what
drives a very labor-intensive effort to transfer information across organizations.
To help with managing information across an organization, industries over the
past few years have been turning to an MBSE approach to support Mission-based
Analysis and Engineering. In interviews regarding the use of MBSE, the respondents
were asked if they can compare their efficiency when they moved from document-based
system engineering to model-based system engineering. Of respondents, 63% said that
their productivity increased with the remaining saying that productivity did not change,
or it decreased (Mazeika & Butleris, 2020). The respondents were also asked if their
work quality improved when they moved from document-based system engineering to
model-based system engineering. The majority of participants agreed that all the factors
(Completeness; Consistency; Communication; Less defects) were improved (Mazeika &
Butleris, 2020). State of the art MBSE tools provide an environment to evaluate the
emerging system design through computer models, and demonstrate system compliance
to user performance and design integrity requirements, all while managing airworthiness
14

risks (Blackburn, Cloutier, Witus, & Hole, 2014). The greatest advantage of MBSE is the
relationship mapping between functions, components, requirements, and risk.
Systems modeling language (SysML), a language variant used in systems
modeling, utilizes physical hierarchy models, functional mapping models, use cases, and
activity diagrams to cross correlate each component to other parts and pieces of the
aircraft. The model-based approach guarantees the completeness and consistency when
tracking requirements from multiple sources (i.e. certification regulations, advisory
circulars, pre-approved means of compliance) by providing formalized modeling
techniques leading to a coherent system model incorporating up-to-date requirements and
analysis (Bleu-Laine, Bendarkar, Xie, & Mavris, 2019). MBSE tools not only capture and
model the stakeholder’s essential information, but also provides an approach to enable a
program office to move through acquisition milestones in a more timely and efficient
manner (Carros, 2019). In a document-based approach, as amendments are made to FAA
regulations and/or standards, or if new modifications are requested on the aircraft, the
amendments must be manually changed and updated in every single regulatory
document. However, the model-based approach can automate the process of updating
amendments and avoid the need to make manual changes in each document (Bleu-Laine,
Bendarkar, Xie, & Mavris, 2019). Therefore, using MBSE for airworthiness certification
has the potential to allow the engineering team to identify not only what criteria is
involved, but also recognize what exact components are affected.
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2.4 Capability of using MBSE for Airworthiness certifications
In June of 2019, individuals from the Georgia Institute of Technology put out a
paper titled A Model-Based System Engineering Approach to Normal Category Airplane
Airworthiness Certification in which they demonstrated a model built for updating FAA
regulations on commercial aircraft. Additionally, in Mar 2014, Stevens Institute of
Technology and Wayne State University conducted research to assess the technical
feasibility of creating and leveraging a more holistic MBSE approach and expected
capabilities from such in their paper Introducing Model Based Systems Engineering
Transforming System Engineering through Model-Based Systems Engineering. However,
there are also challenges in cost and schedule associated with MBSE as pointed out by a
Naval Postgraduate School Thesis on MBSE Methodology and Analysis to Implement
MBSE Post Milestone C.
Bleu-Laine, et.al from Georgia Institute of Technology proposes an MBSE
approach that is envisioned to parametrically transform the document-centric exercise of
airworthiness to a model-based process. The approach helps collect the federal
regulations and the associated means of compliance (MoC) in an integrated system model
along with the relevant mappings between them (Bleu-Laine, Bendarkar, Xie, & Mavris,
2019). Their first step towards solving the issue was to establish a complete
representation of the federal regulations in a high level package structure that sections off
the different parts of the regulations. By using a high level package structure in MBSE,
they were able to separate the certification types. Then using a block definition diagram,
they were able to create a hierarchical view of how the sections and subsections of the
federal regulations are broken down. In one example, federal regulation Subpart B-Flight
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was divided into Controllability, Trim, and Stability. Figure 2 shows the model view of
the controllability portion of the regulation.

Figure 2. Controllability portion of Federal Regulation Subpart B-Flight
hierarchical model (Bleu-Laine, Bendarkar, Xie, & Mavris, 2019).
From there, standards files were mapped back to regulations and modeled using
the mapping referential view in SysML. The stereotype Reference was used to
distinguish that the structures are not shown anymore and that the relationships are the
only important information presented (Bleu-Laine, Bendarkar, Xie, & Mavris, 2019). In
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the end, the model-based approach can automate the process of updating amendments
and avoid the need to make manual changes in each document. This approach allows for
changes in one part of the model to be propagated to others. Figure 3 shows an example
in which a change was made to correct the section number of "Weight and Center of
Gravity" in the federal regulations. Here, the wrong section number "23.201 - Weight and
Center of Gravity" was corrected in the regulations hierarchical view to the right version
of "23.21 - Weight and Center of Gravity". As shown in Figure 3, this change is
conducted in a short time and the update is immediately propagated to other views and
models as soon as the change is performed (Bleu-Laine, Bendarkar, Xie, & Mavris,
2019).

Figure 3. MBSE tools allow for updates in a model to be automatically propagated
to other views and models as soon as the change is performed (Bleu-Laine,
Bendarkar, Xie, & Mavris, 2019)
Airworthiness Certifications rely heavily on identification of SCFs and how they
interact within in the system. Therefore, it is important for a model to capture the entire
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system process. Multiple textbooks have been written for SysML that teach reliable
methods of process modeling utilizing a model-based approach. One such book is SysML
for Systems Engineering by Jon Holt and Simon Perry. Holt and Perry utilize the “seven
views” approach to Process modelling that has been used successfully in both industry
and academia for over two decades (Holt & Perry, 2018). Figure 4 shows a subset of the
MBSE Ontology that has been identified as being relevant for Process modelling. Within
in this model, the Process is associated to various areas of the system such as the Service
in which it realizes, the Process Execution Group it is executed during, and the Use Case
in which it satisfies. Furthermore, other views are also displayed to include the
Stakeholder Role, Activities (to include what Resource those Activities consume), and
Artefacts produced.

Figure 4. Subset of the MBSE Ontology focused on Process modelling (Holt &
Perry, 2018)
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The Process presented here may be used in a flexible way, pending the size and
rigor of the Project. The Process may be used at any level of abstraction of the System
and be used in several different ways. When using the Process for different levels of rigor
or for different scale Projects, the fundamental Process stays the same, but it is the
number of Views produced that changes and the way in which they are realized (Holt &
Perry, 2018). The formal Process is executed on Projects that are critical in some way,
such as safety-critical Systems and for mission-critical Systems (Holt & Perry, 2018).
Figure 5 provides an example of a formal process model using SysML. The formal
Process provides additional views to the Process model to include Source Elements, Rule
Sets, Requirement Viewpoints, and Validation Viewpoints to name a few.

Figure 5. Example of a formal Process model executed on Projects that are safetycritical or mission-critical Systems (Holt & Perry, 2018).
Beyond System Views, MBSE can also be used for complex mathematical
evaluations such as in the prediction of risk and in predictive analytic models to support
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risk identification and management. More generally, models can be used to provide risk
quantification for almost all types of decisions that are made by stakeholders. As an
example, Stevens Institute of Technology and Wayne State University created a Bayesian
model seen in Figure 6 using factors derived from MIL-HDBK-516 from a true story
related to a C-130 Weapon Delivery system. The key characteristics of the approach is
that the model ensures that all factors are considered in the decision-making process, and
that all classes of stakeholders are adequately represented in the decision-making process.
Each factor covers a specific aspect of airworthiness to ensure that all possible
uncertainties and risk are considered in the quantification of risk. The risk index is a
probability distribution where the mean can map to quantities in a risk matrix. With this
systematic and comprehensive treatment of all relevant factors, it provides better risk
identification (Blackburn, Cloutier, Witus, & Hole, 2014).
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Figure 6. Example of how MBSE can be used to predict risk (Blackburn, Cloutier,
Witus, & Hole, 2014).
With MBSE, there are challenges as well and it should be noted that it is not for
every program or platform. The main challenge in implementing MBSE is the additional
cost, which can be significant. The second major challenge in implementing MBSE is the
schedule. It takes time to develop the models and implement the methodology.
Combined, these efforts can take a year or more to implement. The last major challenge
in implementing MBSE is the lack of understanding of what MBSE is and how it can be
useful (Beaufait, 2018). However, with the combined relationship mapping, and the
capability for automated updates across the entire system, there are significant benefits of
using MBSE for continued airworthiness certification on those programs in which it
makes sense to implement.
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2.5 Summary
In this chapter, key terms within the airworthiness certification were first defined
as per DoD guidelines. Secondly, this chapter addressed the benefit of MBSE over
spreadsheet tracking. Spreadsheet tracking, although universally practiced, does not often
allow an individual full insight into a System and the Process behind how that System
operates without extensive piecemeal engineering of various documents. Third, this
chapter addressed the use and benefits of MBSE for airworthiness certification on
military aircraft over traditional spreadsheet tracking. This included the ability to update
requirements and standards and have them immediately propagate across each view of
the System as well as the ability to model an entire process view and perform complex
mathematical calculations. Finally, this chapter addressed some of the challenges of using
MBSE for airworthiness certifications such as cost and schedule. Next, Chapter III goes
into the methodology used to characterize the scope of this thesis.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to expound on the methodology used to identify and
refine the scope against the use of MBSE in the airworthiness process. The methodology
follows the Design Research Methodology (DRM) by Lucienne T.M. Blessing and
Amaresh Chakrabarti. DRM consists of four stages: Research Clarification, Descriptive
Study I, Prescriptive Study, and Descriptive Study II. Research Clarification helps clarify
the current understanding and the overall research aim, develop a research plan, and
provide focus for the subsequent stages. Descriptive Study I target is increasing the
understanding of design and the factors that influence its success by investigating the
phenomenon of design to inform the development support. Prescriptive Study aims at
developing support in a systematic way, considering the results of Descriptive Study I.
Descriptive Study II focuses on evaluating the usability and applicability of the actual
support and its usefulness through a success evaluation (Blessing & Chakrabarti, 2009).
3.2 Research Clarification
The research clarification stage produced two main deliverables: a) current
understanding and b) an overall research plan. To produce the deliverables discussed, the
work was divided into six steps as suggested within DRM:
1. Identify the topic – The broad topic of MBSE and its use in the airworthiness
process was introduced by AFLCMC. With review into the study, the topic
was refined down to the main research objective identified as how can a
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system model aid and automate the execution of the airworthiness process
with particular focus on SCF identification as addressed in the introduction.
2. Clarify the understanding – To clarify the understanding of the Airworthiness
Process, the USAF Airworthiness Policy and Implementation Course taught
by AFLCMC’s Engineering and Technical Management Services Directorate
(AFLCMC/EZZ) was taken in-residence. This course provided an
understanding of the current USAF airworthiness policy, implementation
procedures, and individual/organizational responsibilities (Airworthiness
Office, 2020). Further clarification on the possibility of utilizing a modelbased environment for Airworthiness Certification scenarios was also
researched through various articles and papers. Findings from this research
were highlighted in Chapter II.
3. Develop main questions and hypothesis – To be able to judge the existing
situation and suggest efficient and effective ways of improvement, one’s
understanding needs to involve a link to success (Blessing & Chakrabarti,
2009). For this link, three main questions were developed, each centering
around how MBSE can be used to automate the airworthiness process. The
questions are addressed in 1.3 Research Objective within in the introduction.
4. Decide on a type of research – To identify the type of research suitable to
answer the chosen research questions and verify the hypothesis, the DRM
framework presents seven main types of design research as seen in Figure 7.
A review-based study is based on the review of the literature on design or on
design support only and a comprehensive study is a study in which the results
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are produced by the researcher, i.e. an empirical study, the development of
support, or the evaluation of support (Blessing & Chakrabarti, 2009). A Type
2 – Comprehensive Study of the Existing Situation was chosen as the type of
research. This type of study is undertaken when the criteria being studied can
be established, but a better understanding of the existing situation is necessary
to identify the factors that are most relevant to address to improve the
situation (Blessing & Chakrabarti, 2009). Once sufficient understanding was
gained, an Initial Prescriptive Study was accomplished to indicate how this
understanding can be used to improve the intended design.

Figure 7. DRM breakdown of design research types (Blessing & Chakrabarti, 2009)
5. Understand relevance and contribution – The literature review focused a lot
on traceability and capacity to update multiple views of the model with a
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single change. The aim was to use this understanding to develop the initial
reference model and impact models and how they would be affected by the
ability to automate the airworthiness process. An Areas of Relevance and
Contribution diagram (ARC diagram) as seen in Figure 8, was developed to
understand the areas to which the research project will contribute. The blocks
marked Essential indicate the areas to which the research project will
contribute. This included the development of the model and what that model
can inform leadership regarding risk, safety, and hazards. The blocks marked
Influence indicate the areas to which this thesis will affect, but not be directly
studied. This included the acquisition process between the Contractor, the
SPO, and the Engineering Support. The blocks marked Other indicate the
areas to which may or may not be impacted by the research. Items such as cost
and product specifications were not regarded as a direct influence in the
model.
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Figure 8. Areas of Relevance and Contribution (ARC) Diagram indicating how
portions of the model developed in the research will contribute to the airworthiness
process.
6. Formulate a plan – Taking each of the steps described above, and with the
understanding of the timeframe available, an initial plan was developed. Using
AC-17-01 as a guide, research was directed at creating an SCF thread using
SysML for software requirements found against criteria identified in Section
15 of MIL-HDBK-516C. Emphasis was to be placed on criteria related to SCF
identification and SCF interaction within the System. Overall, the plan would
be completed by defining how the identified criteria could be automated,
organized, or implemented into a digital model using SysML.
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3.3 Descriptive Study I: Understanding Design
The Descriptive Study I produced two deliverables: a) a completed reference
model and b) an updated initial impact model (Blessing & Chakrabarti, 2009). To achieve
these deliverables, the work was divided into five steps as suggested by DRM:
1. Review of the literature – The aim of the literature review in Descriptive
Study I was to extend the level of understanding gained thus far and update
the expectations as represented in the Initial reference and Impact Models
respectively (Blessing & Chakrabarti, 2009). Ebsco Discovery Service and
IEEE Xplore research databases were used throughout the research. The use
of MBSE in airworthiness processes was the primary search throughout the
literature review. However, the search was also expanded into Process
modeling and SysML techniques for safety critical systems to magnify
opportunities within the model solution opportunities. In addition to MBSE
research, literature was also conducted for airworthiness standards and
practices regardless of model-based environments. This research included
various SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice documents which were read
to provide better understanding of aircraft design and development, aircraft
operating environment and functions, hazard identification, and practices for
showing compliance with regulations.
2. Determination of the research focus – From the Research Clarification, it was
evident that focus of the research should be on reducing the workload required
for airworthiness certification through digital automation in a model-based
environment. This included determination of modeling aspects to support the
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process, SysML domain specific system model analysis, and ability to support
parallel and continuous development operations. This research focus coming
directly from the research objective and questions being addressed with effort
to create an SCF thread for the software requirements found in Section 15 of
MIL-HDBK-516C. To aid in the execution of the SysML digital model, it was
decided that data would also be necessary to ensure that the digital
transformation of the airworthiness process being created could be executed in
an aircraft model. The small Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Reference
Architecture used by students at AFIT in the System Engineering department
was chosen for the research focus due to familiarity with the system and
ability to access the data.
3. Development of a research plan – The research plan was developed through
the advice and experience of my thesis advisor, other AFIT faculty, and
personnel from AFLCMC/EZI. Time was to be spent first in understanding
the airworthiness process as it stands today. Then time would be spent in the
model developing tools to automate and digitize the airworthiness process. To
help answer the airworthiness process, the Fundamentals of Airworthiness
course taught by AFLCMC/EZZ was completed to gain a better understanding
of the process as it stands today. Academic courses were also taken at AFIT
within the System Engineering department to understand SysML and its use
within MBSE. Weekly progress checks were also set-up with AFIT faculty
and personnel from AFLCMC/EZI to allow for clarification questions and, as
needed, specific guidance could be provided regarding airworthiness scenarios
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and SysML modeling techniques. Data collection was completed using notes
from the weekly progress checks and SysML models were prepared for
review prior to each meeting.
4. Undertaking of an empirical study – Where the nature of the study revolved
around the capability of MBSE within the airworthiness process with data
found through observation and formal lectures, a qualitative empirical study
was chosen. Founding questions of what the problem with airworthiness is
today, what needs to be captured in a model, and what goes into an SCF
thread were addressed throughout. Each scenario discussed was then modeled
with SysML and provided back to AFLCMC/EZI for acceptance. To further
validate the use of the model, diagrams developed within the SysML
Airworthiness Certification profile were re-constructed utilizing the UAS
Reference Architecture. This allowed for cross-checking of the profile
elements created in the profile against an aircraft system to ensure each
diagram was both relevant and achievable.
5. Deciding of overall conclusions – From the study, it was decided that the key
factor to be addressed within the digital model was the identification of the
SCF and how that SCF interacted within the System. Therefore, it was
decided that a SysML profile would be created that would guide the aircraft
designer in how to construct each SCF within the model and connect the SCF
with the various elements of the System. An Airworthiness Certification
Profile package would be created to serve as the parent modeling aspect. The
Profile could then be incorporated into any system model and provide that
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system the necessary stereotypes and directions to create the diagrams
necessary for the SCF relationship mapping used in the Airworthiness
Certification Process.
3.4 Prescriptive Study: Developing Design Support
Two steps of the Systematic Prescriptive Study Processes were used as part of the
initial Prescriptive Study format followed for this research: Task Clarification and
Conceptualization. The initial Prescriptive Study format followed for this research was
chosen as part of the Type 2 Research evaluated in the Research Clarification stage.
Although MBSE is widely in use, and there is support for its capability, an initial
Prescriptive Study was chosen to fully evaluate the potential of MBSE in airworthiness
certification. The execution of the two steps is completed in Chapter IV, but an overview
of the methodology can be seen here.
Task Clarification is to establish the problem to be solved by the support, to
clarify its requirements, and to better define the desired situation (Blessing &
Chakrabarti, 2009). From the results found in Descriptive Study I, the SysML model
would plan to allow for each criterion established in Section 15 of MIL-HDBK-516C to
be answered. However, focus of the model would be on airworthiness criteria within
Section 15 experiencing repeated non-compliance as identified in AC-17-01. The
guidance in the AC elaborates on particular airworthiness certification requirements that
focus on design contributions that the hardware and software must provide to the system
architecture in support of Safety/Flight Critical functionality, as well as key verification
activities that are needed to evaluate the safety risk associated with the system design
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(Airworthiness, 2017). Seven focus areas discussed in AC-17-01 were addressed for
better understanding of the design, development, integration, and V&V expectations
related to Section 15:
a) SCF Identification
b) SCF Thread Analysis
c) Integration Methodology: System, Software, and Levels of Testing
d) Failure Mode and Effects Testing (FMET)
e) Safety Interlock Design
f) SPA and Software Development Processes
g) Full Qualification of Software
The first task in Conceptualization is to identify and decide which functions the
support needs to have to affect the Key Factors in the intended way (Blessing &
Chakrabarti, 2009). From the results found in Descriptive Study I, the Key Factor that
needed to be addressed was the identification of the SCF and how that SCF interacted
within the System. Therefore, it was decided that a SysML profile would be created that
would guide the aircraft designer in how to construct each SCF within the model and
connect the SCF with the various elements of the System. To ensure that the model had
merit against an established aircraft model, the UAS Reference Architecture was used as
a proof of concept.
3.5 Descriptive Study II: Evaluating Design Support
Descriptive Study II was not addressed in this thesis. Descriptive Study II requires
a completed design and is used to address the impact and evaluation of the design by
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identifying whether the support indeed contributes to success (Blessing & Chakrabarti,
2009). Therefore, although it is a part of DRM, where only an initial design was
completed through a comprehensive Descriptive Study I and an Initial Prescriptive Study,
a second Descriptive Study was not necessary. Future research is recommended in this
area to assess the impact and evaluation of the design in the Airworthiness Certification
Process.
3.6 Summary
This chapter went over the methodology used to identify and refine the scope for
MBSE in the airworthiness process. The methodology follows the DRM by Lucienne
T.M. Blessing and Amaresh Chakrabarti. This chapter discussed the four stages of DRM:
Research Clarification, Descriptive Study I, Prescriptive Study, and Descriptive Study II.
Within Research Clarification, the understanding of the topic was clarified, and an initial
impact model and an Initial reference model were created to capture how the research
applies to each stakeholder and how various portions of the airworthiness process relate
in generating an MFR. For Descriptive Study I, literature was reviewed to identify what
industry and academia has already explored for MBSE in airworthiness processes and
development of a research plan was created. The Prescriptive Study was used to provide
final Task Clarification and Conceptualization to the project. Finally, Descriptive Study
II was not addressed in this thesis. Chapter IV next will provide the results from the
Prescriptive Study portion.
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IV. Analysis and Results
4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter provides details on the completion of the Prescriptive Study which
includes the task clarification and conceptualization portions of the study. Additionally,
application of the study against an established UAS Reference Architecture model will
also be addressed. The task clarification segment concentrates on the seven focus areas
discussed in AC-17-01 that were addressed for better understanding of the design,
development, integration, and V&V expectations related to Section 15. The
conceptualization piece will focus on the construction of the SysML Airworthiness
Certification Profile. Finally, application of the Profile against the UAS Reference
Architecture as a proof of concept will then be discussed.
4.2 Prescriptive Study: Task Clarification
For the Task Clarification, a review of AC-17-01 was conducted in whole and
against the seven focus areas contained within. The first focus area being the
identification of SCFs. Identification of SCFs is critical to understanding the focus area of
airworthiness-oriented functionality (Airworthiness, 2017). The SCF Identification is
used to demonstrate compliance with MIL-HDBK-516 Section 15 criteria 15.1.1
involving the identification of SCFs. The System Safety process (supported by functional
engineering teams) should identify the system’s applicable SCFs, which should then be
used as the foundation for performing SCFTAs (Airworthiness, 2017).
The next focus area is the SCFTA. Where a key purpose of the airworthiness
process is to ensure the design is safe to operate within its intended envelope of
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operation, the SCFTA is a foundational tool for providing evidence that the end-to-end
SCF functionality has been verified (Airworthiness, 2017). An SCFTA is considered to
be satisfactorily completed when all the SCF threads have been fully identified (i.e., all
supporting elements, components, and interfaces identified with associated CSIL) and
complete test coverage of all SCF threads is verified and documented (Airworthiness,
2017). As the SCFTA is a large portion of the analysis, a significant focus was put on this
aspect within the model.
Next in AC-17-01 is the System and Software Integration Methodology. The
system integration methodology is the systematic process that is employed to bring the
subsystem elements of a system together as a functional system (Airworthiness, 2017).
AC-17-01 includes various recommendations to demonstrate compliance with MILHDBK-516 Section 15 criteria involving the system and software integration
methodologies within the integration and test plans. The SCF Thread Layout model
incorporates each of these in the following ways:
a) The complete V&V coverage of requirements, functions, and failure conditions
could be addressed within each respective SCFTA model layout by embedding
diagrams from the system into the Test Methodology block and System Test
testCase elements.
b) End-to-End functional test coverage of SCF threads over all levels of testing
could be addressed in the System Test testCase elements for the respective SCF.
c) Test methodologies that include proper levels of testing and that the testing
focus is appropriate at each level could be addressed in the Test Methodology
block of the SCFTA model.
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d) All essential functionality for intended flight operations could be addressed
with the System Service block.
AC-17-01 then goes into FMET. Understanding the system’s susceptibility to
errors and faults is essential in determining that a system is safe. To demonstrate
compliance with the various MIL-HDBK-516 Section 15 criteria involving FMET, a
comprehensive suite of failure mode tests should be developed and executed at each
integration level of the design (Airworthiness, 2017). The SCF Thread Layout model
addresses this through the Test Methodology and Mitigation Test testCase. FMET test
case results and methodology from the system model are to be embedded into the FMET
block to establish compliance.
Following FMET is Safety Interlock Design. Interlocks are defined in MILHDBK-516C as system design mechanization to enable or disable systems, functions,
subsystems, or modes at given times and conditions. A safety interlock is defined in MILHDBK-516C as an interlock that is necessary for the operation of one or more SCFs. For
Airworthiness purposes, safety interlocks provide control over the functional operation of
an SCF to ensure safe operation is maintained with proper mode engagement (or enabling
of functionality) and disengagement (or disabling of functionality) (Airworthiness, 2017).
To demonstrate compliance with MIL-HDBK-516 Section 15 criteria 15.2.6 and 15.5.4
involving safety interlocks, all safety interlocks associated with an SCF thread should be
identified (Airworthiness, 2017).
AC-17-01 then goes into SPA and Software Development Processes. Numerous
criteria in Section 15 evaluate the suitability of the development and V&V processes used
for producing a system’s SPA and software (Airworthiness, 2017). Numerous attributes
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were identified in this stage of the process as it constitutes the bringing together of each
of the above steps along with providing traceability between such.
The last focus area addressed in AC-17-01 is Full Qualification of Software. Full
qualification of software is achieved when 100 percent of the software-level
requirements are tested before the software is released for flight (Airworthiness, 2017). A
lot of the attributes found in this area dealt with the verification of software to the
requirements.
The attributes listed below were identified as an area to be applied to a digital
environment found from the various focus areas just discussed. Each attribute has been
either directly copied from the AC or interpreted from the AC and re-written. The list in
this research does not cover all process and product attributes identified within the AC.
Any missing attributes from those listed in the AC were either seen as a duplication from
a previous section, or that the task would be completed within a step already portrayed in
the profile. For further clarification of any of the attributes, it is recommended to review
the appropriate section within the AC. The attributes in Table 1 have been grouped
together under the seven focus areas for readability.
Table 1. AC-17-01 To-Be Modeled SCF Attributes from Task Clarification
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6

SCF Identification
SCFs in a system need to be identified and set apart from other functions
SCFs are identified by the program’s System Safety process
SCFs need to trace back to their origin in the System Safety process
SCF analysis is to be supported by engineers from various technical
disciplines
SCFs for a given system will be unique to each platform
SCFs are often put in a list format
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1.7

SCFs can be categorized: Flight Critical, Operation Critical, Emergency
Critical, Indication Critical, and Avoidance Critical.

2
2.1

2.3.6
2.3.7
2.3.8
2.3.9

SCFTA
Decompose: Identify all elements, components and interfaces that support
the operation of a given SCF
Break down into sub-functions
Identify Safety Supporting Elements (SSEs)
Identify Safety Supporting Hardware Elements (SSHE)
Identify Safety Supporting Software Elements (SSSE)
Classify SSE
Mark CSIL Classification for SSE, SSHE, SSSE
Identify interfaces supporting an SCF
Analyzing V&V Coverage: The evidence that complete test coverage has
been achieved from end-to-end across the SCF thread
Trace testing to supporting sub-function
Trace testing of SSE, SSHE, SSSE
Testing needs to be at system integration level, subsystem integration level,
and box/LRU/LRM level
Requirements implemented through components that support an SCF are
tagged as such
Requirements implemented through components that support and SCF are
traced to the SCF
Traceability of SCF to supporting components
Traceability exists from Software to testing performed
Safety interlocks are identified, analyzed, and tested
Identified testing gaps noted

3
3.1
3.2

System and Software Integration
Identify the level of testing on software and hardware
Perform an impact analysis

4
4.1
4.1.1
4.1.1.1
4.1.1.2
4.1.2

FMET
Complete FMET Process
Identify FMET test case driver
System/sub-system requirements
Failure analyses
Determine level of testing

2.1.1
2.1.2
2.1.3
2.1.4
2.2
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.3.3
2.3.4
2.3.5
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4.1.3
4.2

Develop test case for each level
Trace FMET test results to SCF

5
5.1
5.1.1
5.1.2
5.2
5.2.1
5.2.2
5.2.2.1
5.2.2.2
5.2.3
5.3
5.3.1

Safety Interlock
Identify the SI
Use SCFTA to scope where SI resides in design
Ensure traceability from SCF to SI
Analyze the SI
Provide SI condition table/state diagram
Perform coupling analysis
Indicate direct coupling influences from utilized signals
Indicate indirect coupling influences from functional dependencies
Ensure data is traceable to the specific interlock design mechanism
Test the SI
Test case needs to be traceable to the specific interlock design mechanism

6
6.1
6.1.1
6.1.2
6.1.2.1

SPA and Software Development
Identify key attributes about the software
Note development pedigree: developmental or non-developmental
Note CSIL
FOR FLIGHT CRITICAL SSSEs: software is given a CSIL assignment that
establishes processes that include all unique Flight Critical process and
product attributes identified in this attachment
Software supporting SCFs need to be identified as SSSEs
Number of SCFs supported by given SSSE is documented
Requirements are robust
Performance requirements identified and documented
Software requirements are established from a clear allocation of
system/subsystem requirements
Software requirements trace to no more than, and no less than, one parent
requirement
Requirements are clearly identified and delineated from design
Design timing requirements are defined and documented
Software is integrated and tested in multi-level approach with a minimum of
three levels utilized: unit level, software integration level (including
hardware-software integration), and CSCI/requirements qualification level
testing
Coding standards supporting safety are utilized

6.1.3
6.1.3.1
6.2
6.2.1
6.2.2
6.2.3
6.2.4
6.2.5
6.3

6.4
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6.5
6.6
6.7
6.7.1
6.7.2
6.7.3
6.7.4
6.7.5
6.7.6
6.7.7
6.7.8
6.7.9
6.7.10
6.7.11
6.7.12
6.8
6.8.1
6.8.2
6.8.3
6.8.4
7
7.1
7.2
7.3

Software safety process performed
Peer reviews conducted
Traceability database is utilized that facilitates linking of traceable objects
All traceable items (e.g., requirements, design, SCFs) can be captured in the
database as a unique object that can be traced to multiple objects
Bidirectional traceability established from software requirements to parent
requirements up through system requirements
Bidirectional traceability established from software requirements to design
Bidirectional traceability established from design to source code
Bidirectional traceability established from source code to test cases
Bidirectional traceability established from software requirements to test
cases
Bidirectional traceability established from test cases to test procedures
Bidirectional traceability established from software requirements to
supported SCFs
Bidirectional traceability established from test cases to supported SCFs
Bidirectional traceability established from source code to SCF threads
The trace to source code will support the SCFTA verification activity
All source code in a software flight release traces to a software requirement
System and Software V&V is conducted
Unit level testing performed when created (or modified) and results
documented
Software design requirements are fully verified
System/subsystem performance requirements supported by software are
verified
System/subsystem safety requirements supported by software are verified
Full Qualification of Software
Demonstrate that all changed software meets requirements
Demonstrate that all unchanged software continues to meet requirements
Perform a systematic verification of every software requirement on the target
processing hardware configuration
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4.3 Prescriptive Study: Conceptualization
As discussed in the methodology, the key factor to be addressed within the digital
model was the identification of the SCF and how that SCF interacted within the System.
Therefore, it was decided that a SysML profile would be created that would guide the
aircraft designer in how to construct each SCF within the model and connect the SCF
with the various elements of the System. An Airworthiness Certification Profile package
was created to serve as the parent modeling aspect. The Profile package contains
mechanisms that allow metaclasses from existing metamodels to be extended to adapt
them for different purposes (Object Management Group, 2019). Each of the modeling
aspects created for purposes within the airworthiness certification process are contained
in this profile. The Profile package can be shared and loaded within a system model
providing a system with the necessary stereotypes and formats to guide the system
modeler how to meet various standards within the airworthiness process. As seen in
Figure 9, the Airworthiness Certification Profile package is sub-divided into four
packages: 1) System Model Example, 2) System Safety, 3) MIL-HDBK-516C, and 4)
Custom Stereotypes.
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Figure 9. Airworthiness Certification Profile Containment Tree
The System Model Example is utilized in the profile simply as an example and
does not direct how the System Engineering team should model their system. The intent
of this portion of the Airworthiness Certification Profile is to show how the Profile can be
used with a new aircraft model or incorporated into an existing model. The Profile is not
set up to change or replace an existing model, but instead use of the example in the
Airworthiness Certification Profile is to demonstrate how various elements from the
model are utilized in the SCF thread. For the example, the package is further divided into
four sub-packages: 1) Requirements, 2) Use Case and Behavior, 3) Structure, and 4) Test
and Analysis. The Requirements represent all the requirements placed on the program.
This includes, but is not limited to, the System Requirements, Safety Requirements, and
Software Requirements. Use Case and Behavior represents the location of the use case
diagram that describes the usage of a system (subject) by its actors (environment) to
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achieve a goal, that is realized by the subject providing a set of services to selected actors
(Object Management Group, 2019). The Structure represents the physical hardware and
software components of the system and identifies how each interact within the system
itself. Finally, Test and Analysis represents the Verification and Validation portions of
the system. This includes, but is not limited to, test methodology, failure testing,
mitigation testing, system testing, and software testing.
The System Safety package is also used as an example in the profile and does not
direct how the System Engineering team should model their system. The System Safety
was placed in the profile to represent an area for hazard identification and placement of
the Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA). All other safety documentation and/or analysis
can also be placed in this package as needed to allow for proper tracing between the
system and its safety and development process.
The MIL-HDBK-516C package serves as the focal point of the Airworthiness
Certification Profile. The current profile is set with only the elements from Section 15 –
Computer Systems and Software per scope of the research. However, the package is
designed to be expanded for each section. The Section 15 package contains four
additional packages: 1) Certification Standards, 2) Safety Critical Function Identification,
3) Safety Critical Function Thread Analysis, and 4) Supporting Documentation.
Although not explicitly mentioned in AC-17-01, the Certification Standards
package was one of the first portions of the model to be added. This was done by
breaking down the standards and methods of certification identified in MIL-HDBK-516C
Section 15 with the use of a requirements diagram. To separate a system requirement
from a method of compliance, an Airworthiness Standard custom stereotype was created
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with a stereotype extendedRequirement Generalization, see Figure 10. Then a
Requirement Diagram was created that encompasses each respective standard and
evaluation criterion, see Figure 11 for a snapshot portion of the requirement diagram.

Figure 10. Airworthiness Standard Custom Stereotype

Figure 11. Portion of the MIL-HDBK-516C Section 15 Airworthiness Standard
Requirement Diagram
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Once the Airworthiness Standards were in place, the rest of the Profile was
constructed against the To-Be Modeled Attributes from AC-17-01 listed in Table 1. As
the model progressed, it was found that there was overlap between the focus areas
discussed in the Task Clarification. Therefore, each portion of the model discussed below
takes from Table 1 as a whole and combines those attributes that correlate with each
other in the model design. Therefore, each diagram modeled answers multiple of the
attributes found in AC-17-01. Individual Tables are provided for each section that
identify what attributes were included in a particular design. Table 2 below shows the
comparison of the AC-17-01 Focus Areas to the Profile model diagrams that are
addressed throughout this research.
Table 2. Comparison of AC-17-01 Focus Areas to the Model Focus Areas
AC-17-01 Focus Areas

Model Focus Areas

SCF Identification
SCF Thread Analysis
Integration Methodology
Failure Mode and Effects Testing
Safety Interlock Design
SPA and Software Development
Full Qualification of Software

Certification Standards
SCF Identification
SCF Thread Analysis
Physical System
Computer System Integration Level
Validation and Verification
Failure and Effects Testing
Safety Interlock Design
Requirement Mapping

The first task to be modeled was SCF Identification. The identification of SCFs is
critical to understanding the focus area of airworthiness-oriented functionality. All
criteria in Section 15 indirectly rely on SCF identification since the criteria are to be
applied to equipment supporting SCFs (Airworthiness, 2017). AC-17-01 Attachment 1
46

contains detailed guidance regarding SCF identification. The SCF Identification package
was created and a Critical Functional Decomposition Block Definition Diagram (BDD)
was generated. The attributes listed in Table 1 were evaluated against SCF Identification
and those listed below in Table 3 were the decided attributes to model in the Critical
Function Decomposition BDD.
Table 3. AC-17-01 Critical Functional Decomposition Block Definition Diagram
Attributes
1
1.1
1.2
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7

SCF Identification
SCFs in a system need to be identified and set apart from other functions
SCFs are identified by the program’s System Safety process
SCF analysis is to be supported by engineers from various technical
disciplines
SCFs for a given system will be unique to each platform
SCFs are often put in a list format
SCFs can be categorized: Flight Critical, Operation Critical, Emergency
Critical, Indication Critical, and Avoidance Critical.

The SCFs are identified by the program’s System Safety process (Attribute 1.2)
and are originated in the Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA), which lays the foundation
for identifying hazards within the system. Once the SCF’s are identified within the
system, the Profile models the SCF’s by breaking them down into a functional
decomposition BDD separated into hierarchical columns composed of the aircraft system,
functional group, function, and sub-function (Attribute 1.1, 1.5, 1.6). Each function is
displayed as blocks refactored and converted to activities. Each activity block is linked
through a directed composition flowing from the aircraft system down to the lowest subfunction. Folders were used to group each portion of the model and any further comments
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and/or notes may be added for clarification. See Figure 12 for the BDD utilized in the
Profile. SCF’s are then identified using a custom stereotype and can be highlighted a
separate color for ease of recognition (Attribute 1.1). To model the SCF Decomposition
diagram, the Profile uses a Safety Critical Function custom stereotype that Extends to
Metaclass Action and Metaclass Class with appropriate attributes. Enumerations for
Safety Critical Function Category (Attribute 1.7) and Severity (Attribute 1.1) are also
used to provide tags to further classify the SCF. See Figure 13 for the custom stereotype
used within the Profile. With the use of the Profile, engineers from various technical
disciplines have ready access and ease of SCF identification (Attribute 1.4).
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Figure 12. Safety Critical Functional Decomposition with SCF identified using a
custom stereotype and highlighted in red.

Figure 13. SCF custom stereotype used to classify the critical functions identified.
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The Safety Critical Functional Thread Analysis package was next created to
contain an SCF Thread Layout diagram that links each of the segments that the SCF
interacts with within the system. An SCF thread is defined in MIL-HDBK-516C as: the
combination of elements/components within a system and the required interfacing and
interaction of those elements/components whose overall contribution is necessary for the
operation of a given SCF (Airworthiness, 2017). The guidance given in AC-17-01
elaborates on particular airworthiness certification requirements that focus on design
contributions that the hardware and software must provide to the system architecture in
support of Safety/Flight Critical functionality, as well as key verification activities that
are needed to evaluate the safety risk associated with the system design (Airworthiness,
2017). See AC-17-01 Attachment 2 for further clarification on SCF thread analysis.
For the SCFTA, Table 4 was constructed with the various attributes that were
discovered to provide the details required for the thread analysis. To generate an SCF
thread, the Airworthiness Certification Profile utilizes a second BDD called SCF Thread
Layout embedded within the activity block of the respective SCF sub-function identified
and displayed in the functional decomposition described above. A BDD was used to
capture the SCF Thread as a combination of elements/components within a system and
the required interfacing and interaction of those elements/components as defined in AC17-01 (Airworthiness, 2017). The BDD intent was to focus not only on the physical
hierarchy, but on all aspects of the function to include the requirements, use case,
hazards, and artifacts generated. The thread layout does allow for hyperlinks to Internal
Block Diagrams, Activity Diagrams, State Machine Diagrams, etc. needed to fully define
the functional thread. Therefore, in meeting typical behavioral modeling, an Activity
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Diagram could be used in addition to the BDD for the SCF Thread interaction with the
system. For the Activity Diagram, SysML partitions, known as swim lanes, could be used
to allocate hardware and software elements to the function. The SysML partitions display
the functions/activity being modeled using the physical system blocks which
accomplishes the same allocate relationship as if using a BDD. The full SCF Thread
Layout for the given SCF 1.1.2.1 Sub-Function can be seen in Figure 14.
Table 4. AC-17-01 To-Be Modeled Attributes for SCF Thread.
1
1.3
2
2.1
2.1.1
2.3
5
5.1
5.1.1
5.1.2
6.7.8

SCF Identification
SCFs need to trace back to their origin in the System Safety process
SCFTA
Decompose: Identify all elements, components and interfaces that support
the operation of a given SCF
Break down into sub-functions
Analyzing V&V Coverage: The evidence that complete test coverage has
been achieved from end-to-end across the SCF thread
Safety Interlock
Identify the SI
Use SCFTA to scope where SI resides in design
Ensure traceability from SCF to SI
Bidirectional traceability established from software requirements to
supported SCFs
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Figure 14. SCF Thread Layout from Airworthiness Certification Profile that
Displays the Full SCF Thread of an SCF.
To provide full understanding of how the SCF operates within the system, the
SCF Thread Layout centers around a single SCF Sub-Function displayed as an activity
block (Attribute 2.1.1). To accomplish this understanding, a trace relationship is
generated from the SCF Sub-Function back to the originating Hazard block (Attribute
1.3). The Hazard block can be used to characterize the hazard identified in the FHA, or
the functional flow of the hazard with a hyperlinked Activity Diagram. The Hazard is
then traced back to the Functional Hazard Analysis block to provide insight into the
origination of the SCF from the System Safety review (Attribute 1.3). To provide
understanding of where the SCF Sub-Function is within the design, the SCF is also tied to
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the respective Use Case through a refine relationship. The physical architecture,
represented by a System block, is utilized to identify all elements, components and
interfaces that support the operation of a given SCF System (Attribute 2.1). Where the
SCF Sub-Function must pass multiple testing procedures, the results of each Validation
and Verification exercise are displayed as a block with an aggregation back to the SCF
Sub-Function (Attribute 2.3). Any Safety Interlock Mechanisms are also displayed on the
SCFTA through an aggregation back to the SCF Sub-Function (Attribute 5.1, 5.1.1).
Requirements being met by the SCF are displayed through a satisfy relationship between
the SCF and the various requirements being met (Attribute 6.7.8). Beyond AC-17-01,
both an Artifact and Risk Mitigation block were placed on the diagram to link
documentation created through the analysis of the SCF.
Furthermore, the SCF is also related through a satisfy relationship to requirements
utilized to mitigate the identified system hazards and meet environmental and
occupational hazards. The Safety Requirements can be either derived from the System
Requirements or stand alone. Then where the SCF is utilized to satisfy either a safety
requirement or a System Requirement, these requirements are given a safety requirement
stereotype to indicate their relationship to an SCF. Finally, SCF Sub-Functions are
displayed through an aggregation to the SCF to allow further relationship mapping
between each.
Going beyond the initial identification of the SCF for the System, it is also
important to show how it operates in the system. The first is to identify all the elements,
hardware and software components, and interfaces that are necessary for the safe
execution of all identified SCFs (Airworthiness, 2017). In the Profile, a hyperlink is
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attached to the System block of the respective SCF Sub-Function that links to a Physical
System Decomposition BDD. This Physical System Composition is then utilized to
further answer various AC-17-01 attributes listed in Table 5. Figure 15 shows the
Physical System Composition BDD as depicted in the Profile.
Table 5. AC-17-01 To-Be Modeled Attributes for Physical System Composition
2
2.1
2.1.1
2.1.2
2.1.3
2.1.4
2.2
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.3.6
6
6.1
6.1.1
6.1.2
6.1.2.1

6.1.3
6.1.3.1
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7.4
6.7.5
6.7.10
6.7.11
6.7.12

SCFTA
Decompose: Identify all elements, components and interfaces that support
the operation of a given SCF
Break down into sub-functions
Identify Safety Supporting Elements (SSEs)
Identify Safety Supporting Hardware Elements (SSHE)
Identify Safety Supporting Software Elements (SSSE)
Classify SSE
Mark CSIL Classification for SSE, SSHE, SSSE
Identify interfaces supporting an SCF
Traceability of SCF to supporting components
SPA and Software Development
Identify key attributes about the software
Note development pedigree: developmental or non-developmental
Note CSIL
FOR FLIGHT CRITICAL SSSEs: software is given a CSIL assignment that
establishes processes that include all unique Flight Critical process and
product attributes identified in this attachment
Software supporting SCFs need to be identified as SSSEs
Number of SCFs supported by given SSSE is documented
Coding standards supporting safety are utilized
Software safety process performed
Peer reviews conducted
Bidirectional traceability established from design to source code
Bidirectional traceability established from source code to test cases
Bidirectional traceability established from source code to SCF threads
The trace to source code will support the SCFTA verification activity
All source code in a software flight release traces to a software requirement
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Figure 15. Physical System Composition BDD portion of the SCF Thread Layout
model that shows the relationship between the physical system and the function.
For the Physical System Composition BDD, the Safety Supporting Elements
(SSE), Safety Supporting Hardware Elements (SSHE), and Safety Supporting Software
Elements (SSSE) that enable the operation of the SCF Sub-Function (Attribute 2.1) are
identified within the system(Attribute 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4), given the appropriate
stereotype seen in Figure 16, and allocated to the SCF Sub-Functions (Attribute 2.1.1,
2.3.6). The SSE, SSHE, and SSSE are brought into the Profile from the System Design
Model. The Hardware block can each be further embedded with an Internal Block
Diagram (IBD) to display the interfaces that support the given SCF Sub-Function
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(Attribute 2.2.2). Additionally, the Software block can be further embedded with an IBD
or Activity Diagram to display the innerworkings of the software (Attribute 6.1).

Figure 16. Safety Supporting Element Stereotype for Physical Hardware and
Software Components Supporting an SCF
The second purpose of the SCFTA is ensure the identified elements and
components are developed at Computer System Integrity Levels (CSILs) appropriate for
SCF applications, and that safety critical interfaces are identified as such (Airworthiness,
2017). To accomplish this in the SCF Thread Layout model, each portion of the physical
architectural system that interacts with the SCF is given the appropriate safety critical
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stereotype (Attribute 2.2.1). As depicted in Figure 15 above, the portion of the system
that interacts with the SCF is given a safety supporting element stereotype. The Software
and Hardware that enable the SCF are also given a custom stereotype of safety supporting
software element and safety supporting hardware element respectively to differentiate the
components from other portions of the design (Attribute 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, 6.1.3).
Additionally, tags for the level of testing, software development pedigree, and the CSIL
can be inputted into the stereotype to ensure the identified elements and components are
developed at the appropriate levels (Attribute 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.1.2.1).
Staying within the Physical System Composition, the software portion of the
architecture traces to the source code and safety standards are utilized with the coding in
addition to all Safety Processes (Attribute 6.4, 6.5). Any Peer Reviews conducted on the
coding are also associated with the software (Attribute 6.6). For the source code,
bidirectional traceability is established from the design to the source code through
association (Attribute 6.7.4). Bidirectional traceability is also established from the source
code to source code test cases and SCF with aggregation (Attribute 6.7.5, 6.7.10). These
traces with the source code will support the SCFTA verification activity (Attribute
6.7.11). Furthermore, all source code for the software allocates to the coding activity that
in turn satisfies the appropriate Software Requirement (Attribute 6.7.12).
The third purpose of the SCFTA is to verify that end-to-end V&V coverage is
achieved by the tests used to verify the SCF functionality (Airworthiness, 2017). To
accomplish this in the SCF Thread Layout model, the testing event(s) that have occurred
for the SCF functionality are displayed within the Validation and Verification block on
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the SCF Thread Layout. The Validation and Verification block contains a hyperlink to a
Validation and Verification BDD specific to the SCF Sub-Function as seen in Figure 17.

Figure 17. SCF Test Methodology and System Test portion of the SCF Thread
Layout model.
In verifying the end-to-end V&V portion of the model, the Validation and
Verification BDD helps answer additional attributes from AC-17-01 listed in Table 6.
This BDD allows for systematic testing of every software requirement on the associated
hardware for the intended SCF Sub-Function (Attribute 6.8, 7.3). Then the testing can be
traced to the supporting SCF sub-function, SSHE, and SSSE through an association
between the SCF or component and the respective test cases (Attribute 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.7,
6.7.9). The Validation and Verification BDD also utilizes a block for Test Procedures to
be embedded in which each test case is aggregated to. The Test Procedures establish the
Level of Testing to be completed (Attribute 2.3.3, 3.1, 6.7.7, 6.8.1). Additionally, test
cases are established for system integration level, subsystem integration level, and
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box/LRU/LRM level (Attribute 2.3.3). The respective requirement that each test case
verifies is also displayed in this BDD (Attribute 6.7.6). Finally, the Validation and
Verification BDD tests safety interlocks identified for the SCF and any testing gaps
throughout the process can be noted (Attribute 2.38, 2.3.9). Overall, by linking the test
events into the SCF Thread Layout model it allows airworthiness review personnel the
ability to easily verify that end-to-end V&V coverage is achieved by the tests used to
verify the SCF functionality.
Table 6. AC-17-01 To-Be Modeled Attributes for Validation and Verification
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.3.3
2.3.7
2.3.8
2.3.9
3
3.1
6.7.6
6.7.7
6.7.9
6.8
6.8.1
7.3

Analyzing V&V Coverage: The evidence that complete test coverage has
been achieved from end-to-end across the SCF thread
Trace testing to supporting sub-function
Trace testing of SSE, SSHE, SSSE
Testing needs to be at system integration level, subsystem integration level,
and box/LRU/LRM level
Traceability exists from Software to testing performed
Safety interlocks are identified, analyzed, and tested
Identified testing gaps noted
System and Software Integration
Identify the level of testing on software and hardware
Bidirectional traceability established from software requirements to test
cases
Bidirectional traceability established from test cases to test procedures
Bidirectional traceability established from test cases to supported SCFs
System and Software V&V is conducted
Unit level testing performed when created (or modified) and results
documented
Perform a systematic verification of every software requirement on the target
processing hardware configuration

Another portion of the Validation and Verification BDD is the FMET.
Understanding the system’s susceptibility to errors and faults is essential in determining
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that a system is safe. The Validation and Verification BDD contains a FMET block with
a hyperlink to a FMET BDD seen in Figure 18 in which the FMET analysis for the
specific SCF Sub-Function can be conducted.

Figure 18. FMET BDD embedded in the FMET block which is contained within the
Validation and Verification BDD
The FMET BDD addresses AC-17-01 attributes listed in Table 7. The FMET
Process begins with identification of the level of testing, a trace to the respective
requirements, and an association to the failure analysis (Attribute 4.1, 4.1.1, 4.1.1.1,
4.1.1.2). Then test cases are developed for each level and FMET cases are to be run at
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every level (Attribute 4.1.2, 4.1.3). Each test result is traced back to the SCF through an
allocation with the FMET block (Attribute 4.2).
Table 7. AC-17-01 To-Be Modeled Attributes for FMET.
4
4.1
4.1.1
4.1.1.1
4.1.1.2
4.1.2
4.1.3
4.2

FMET
Complete FMET Process
Identify FMET test case driver
System/sub-system requirements
Failure analyses
Determine level of testing
Develop test case for each level
Trace FMET test results to SCF

Another aspect of the SCF Thread Layout Model is the identification of a Safety
Interlock Mechanism with the SCF Sub-Function. For Airworthiness purposes, safety
interlocks provide control over the functional operation of an SCF to ensure safe
operation is maintained with proper mode engagement (or enabling of functionality) and
disengagement (or disabling of functionality) (Airworthiness, 2017). As seen in Table 8,
various aspects of the safety interlock mechanism need to be modeled. This is done by
first connecting the Safety Interlock Mechanism with the SCF Sub-Function through an
aggregation on the SCF Thread Layout model (Attribute 5.1.1, 5.1.2). The Safety
Interlock Mechanism is given the safety supporting element with a hyperlink to the
Safety Interlock Mechanism BDD for the respective SCF seen in Figure 19.
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Table 8. AC-17-01 To-Be Modeled Attributes for Safety Interlock.
5
5.1
5.1.1
5.1.2
5.2
5.2.1
5.2.2
5.2.2.1
5.2.2.2
5.2.3
5.3
5.3.1

Safety Interlock
Identify the SI
Use SCFTA to scope where SI resides in design
Ensure traceability from SCF to SI
Analyze the SI
Provide SI condition table/state diagram
Perform coupling analysis
Indicate direct coupling influences from utilized signals
Indicate indirect coupling influences from functional dependencies
Ensure data is traceable to the specific interlock design mechanism
Test the SI
Test case needs to be traceable to the specific interlock design mechanism

Figure 19. Safety Interlock Mechanism BDD for the specific SCF Sub-Function
embedded in the Safety Interlock Mechanism block of the SCF Thread Layout.
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The Safety Interlock Mechanism BDD connects the safety supporting element to
its individual test cases and coupling analysis for direct and indirect influences (Attribute
5.2.2, 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2, 5.3.1). A table or state diagram can also be hyperlinked to the
Safety Interlock Mechanism block as needed (Attribute 5.2.1). Finally, the BDD allows
for the data surrounding the mechanism be traced back to the specific mechanism
(Attribute 5.2.3).
The final piece of the SCF Thread Layout model was to incorporate each of the
various requirements that connect with the individual SCF. To accomplish this, the SCF
Thread Layout model uses a satisfy relationship between the SCF and the Requirements.
To maintain simplicity of the model, a Requirement element is used on the SCF Thread
Layout model that hyperlinks to a Requirement Diagram seen in Figure 20 that contains
each of the Requirements associated with the SCF. The Requirement Diagram also helps
to complete various attributes from AC-17-01. As seen in Table 9, multiple portions of
the overall process stem back to the requirements.
One of the first steps was to identify each Requirement that supports an SCF
(Attribute 2.3.4). This was done using a safety requirement stereotype that behaves as an
extendedRequirement through a generalization link. The SCF Sub-Function then
connects to each requirement through a satisfy link (Attribute 2.3.5). This satisfy link
includes, but is not limited to Performance, Design, Timing, Software, Safety, and
System requirements that have been identified and documented (Attribute 6.2.1, 6.2.4,
6.2.5). The diagram is also used to establish clear allocation of software requirements
from system/subsystem requirements and where those software requirements trace back
to (Attribute 6.2.2, 6.2.3). The diagram is also used to provide opportunity to showcase
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software design requirement verification and traceability (Attributes 6.7.1, 6.7.2, 6.7.3,
6.8.2, 6.8.3, 6.8.4, 7.1, and 7.2).

Figure 20. Requirement Diagram that shows which requirements the individual
Sub-Function satisfy.
Table 9. AC-17-01 To-Be Modeled Attributes for Requirements.
2.3.4
2.3.5
6.2
6.2.1
6.2.2
6.2.3
6.2.4
6.2.5

Requirements implemented through components that support an SCF are
tagged as such
Requirements implemented through components that support and SCF are
traced to the SCF
Requirements are robust
Performance requirements identified and documented
Software requirements are established from a clear allocation of
system/subsystem requirements
Software requirements trace to no more than, and no less than, one parent
requirement
Requirements are clearly identified and delineated from design
Design timing requirements are defined and documented
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6.7
6.7.1
6.7.2
6.7.3
6.8.2
6.8.3
6.8.4
7
7.1
7.2

Traceability database is utilized that facilitates linking of traceable objects
All traceable items (e.g., requirements, design, SCFs) can be captured in the
database as a unique object that can be traced to multiple objects
Bidirectional traceability established from software requirements to parent
requirements up through system requirements
Bidirectional traceability established from software requirements to design
Software design requirements are fully verified
System/subsystem performance requirements supported by software are
verified
System/subsystem safety requirements supported by software are verified
Full Qualification of Software
Demonstrate that all changed software meets requirements
Demonstrate that all unchanged software continues to meet requirements

4.4 Application of Profile Against UAS Reference Architecture
The MBSE UAS Reference Architecture used in this study was originally created
for a three-part course series taught within the Systems Engineering Department at AFIT.
Throughout each UAS course, students address systems engineering concepts such as
mission analysis, requirements refinement, system design, and validation and
verification. The final culminating event leads to a product build and flight test of the
designed UAV.
The mission of the small UAS seen in Figure 21 was to provide forward deployed
ground-based units the capability to conduct low altitude, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), and small payload deployment operations from a safe standoff
distance. The UAS was constructed to operate using both auto-pilot and manual
operations. Students would utilize the MBSE Reference Architecture throughout the
course to identify the system components necessary to complete the mission. As the
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physical UAV is being developed, a digital model of the system and its interactions was
evaluated for pre-built analysis and study.

Figure 21. Small UAS Used for AFIT UAS Instructional Course Series.
To begin, the Airworthiness Certification Profile was loaded into the UAS
Reference Architecture. Then, in utilizing the UAS Reference Architecture, and in
following the design of the Airworthiness Certification Profile, the UAS was broken
down into its mission functions grouped by Functional Group, Function, and SubFunction. Those functions determined as Safety Critical were given the safety critical
function stereotype from the custom stereotypes in the Profile and were highlighted in red
as seen in Figure 22.
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Figure 22. UAS Safety Critical Function Decomposition utilizing the Custom
Stereotypes from the Airworthiness Certification Profile.
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In maintaining the format of the Airworthiness Certification Profile, following the
identification of each SCF, an SCF Thread Analysis was conducted on the SCF SubFunctions. For this research, the Provide UAV Propulsion Sub-Function of the Control
UAV Aircraft in Flight Function was chosen. The Provide UAV Propulsion Sub-Function
seen in Figure 23 was brought into an SCF Thread Layout BDD as depicted in the Profile
and further broken down into the various elements that define and support the function.

Figure 23. SCF Thread for Provide UAV Propulsion SCF Sub-Function.
In following the criteria laid out in AC-17-01, the first goal of the SCF Thread is
to identify the components that enable the function to occur. For the Provide UAV
Propulsion SCF Sub-Function, the Propulsion Module elements from the Physical
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Architecture portion of the System Model were added to the thread. Then, where the
Propulsion Module is designated as supporting an SCF, the Propulsion Module was
stereotyped as a safety supporting element. A hyperlink was then added to the Propulsion
Module block to a Propulsion Model BDD that further identified the components that
make up the Propulsion Module as seen in Figure 24. This included the Electronic Speed
Controller (ESC), Motor, and Propeller. Each of these individual components were then
designated as safety supporting hardware elements and were allocated back to the
Provide UAV Propulsion SCF Sub-Function for relationship continuity.

Figure 24. Physical Structure Portion of the Safety Critical Thread that shows the
Allocation of the SSHE to the SCF.
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Another step in the SCF Thread is the identification and linking of the SCF SubFunction to the Validation and Verification efforts completed. From Figure 23, the
Validation and Verification is represented as a block to match with the SCF Thread
Layout in the Profile. That Validation and Verification block then hyperlinks to a
separate Provide UAV Propulsion Sub-Function Validation and Verification BDD seen in
Figure 25. Here the various testCase events conducted on the propulsion portion of the
physical architecture are linked to the Provide UAV Propulsion Sub-Function. The
Validation and Verification BDD also shows how each testCase is conducted to verify
the Controlled Flight requirement.

Figure 25. UAV Propulsion Validation and Verification Portion of the SCF Thread
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4.5 Summary
This chapter provided details on the completion of the Prescriptive Study which
included the task clarification and conceptualization portions of the study. Additionally,
application of the study was completed against an established UAS Reference
Architecture model. The task clarification segment concentrated on the seven focus areas
discussed in AC-17-01 and each were addressed for better understanding of the design,
development, integration, and V&V expectations related to Section 15. The
conceptualization piece focused on the construction of the SysML Airworthiness
Certification Profile. Finally, an application of the Profile against the UAS Reference
Architecture as a proof of concept was conducted.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Chapter Overview
The preceding thesis outlines a tailored model-based system engineering (MBSE)
solution to support Safety Critical Function (SCF) thread analysis against airworthiness
criteria found in Section 15 of MIL-HDBK-516C. Within this scope, the research
identified an SCF domain-specific profile and style guide using the Systems Modeling
Language (SysML) and domain-specific extensions. The SCF profile was applied to an
Unmanned Airborne System (UAS) designed and flight tested as a course sequence in
AFIT’s Graduate school. The contributions of this research identified: 1) how a system
model can support the execution of the airworthiness process, 2) how modeling can be
minimally stereotyped to support various airworthiness analyses, and where airworthiness
analysis could be automated and leaned.
This chapter discusses how the three investigative questions from Chapter I were
addressed using the SCF Profile design model completed in Chapter IV. Following the
answers to the investigative questions, recommendations for action to be completed by
the Air Force as it applies the SCF Profile model are provided. Finally, recommendations
for future research for expanding and refining the SCF Profile model are provided.
5.2 Research Questions
The first question addressed throughout this research was what modeling aspects
and/or program artifacts must be created to support the airworthiness certification
process. In working with a SysML domain specific model, the digital tool provides a lot
of built-in features that enable system design, system decomposition, and system
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relationship traceability. However, one of the great powers of SysML is the ease in which
a user can tailor the given language to meet the needs of an individual system model. For
the Airworthiness Certification Profile created for this research, both built in and tailored
domain specific extensions were utilized.
For the tailored domain specific extensions, there were multiple different
modeling aspects created. The first was the creation of custom stereotypes to identify and
define various aspects of the System. This included safety critical function, hazard, safety
supporting element, safety supporting hardware element, safety supporting software
element, airworthiness standard, safety requirement, and safety interlock. For the custom
stereotypes, enumerations were also created and applied to tag and refine the stereotypes
with various categories and specifications. Second, the safety and airworthiness standards
and methods of compliance from DoD references were integrated into the system model
utilizing a requirement diagram and distinguished with the airworthiness standard custom
stereotype contained in the Profile. Third, each SCF identified in the System Safety
Process was categorized through a decomposition of the system by way of Functional
Group, Function, and Sub-Function. Fourth, a thread for each identified SCF was created
to provide relationship mapping between the various elements and events that support the
operation of a given SCF. Finally, SysML Analysis Diagrams are to be used with the
System Model relationships to create reports necessary to show completion of the
standards and methods of compliance required for the airworthiness certification.
The second question addressed through this research is what airworthiness
analyses can be done with a SysML domain specific system model. The incorporation of
a SysML domain specific digital model into the Airworthiness Certification Process
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provides significant impact into various stages of the overall airworthiness analysis. The
first is the opportunity for the Airworthiness Home Office to transfer use of the Artifacts
Tool from a document-based environment into a model-based asset. With a model-based
Artifacts Tool, Airworthiness Certification Officials can conduct their review using the
very system model utilized by the developer of the aircraft. This analysis is completed
using a Requirement Table that lists the Standards and Methods of Compliance along
with a trace to various model relationships, how the standard is being verified, any risk
associated with the standard, and how that standard is being verified in model. The
Requirement Table works similar to the Excel version of the Artifacts Tool in use and
would require minimal adjustment on the Certification Official.
The second analyses that can be done with a SysML domain specific system
model is that of an Allocation Matrix. This matrix shows the allocated relationship
between various pieces of the model. Commonly, it shows the allocation between the
functions, or activities and the corresponding block in the model. This is important for
quick and easy analysis to ensure that each function has a corresponding component that
enables that function.
Finally, and probably most important, a SysML domain specific model allows the
Airworthiness Certification Official to thoroughly analyze the SCF Thread. The digital
model, when done correctly, establishes a relation map between each of the elements that
creates the desired thread between the various portions of the model. With the SCF
Thread, Airworthiness Certification Officials can identify the combination of
elements/components within a system and the required interfacing and interaction of
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those elements/components whose overall contribution is necessary for the operation of a
given SCF as defined by MIL-HDBK-516C.
Finally, the third question addressed throughout this research was how could
airworthiness analysis be automated or leaned to support parallel, continuous
development operations. The intent of this question was to discover ways in which the
model could generate an SCF analysis in a black box like environment without
continuous user input. However, throughout this research, it was quickly discovered that
to automate the process, a Profile first needs to be established that can contain the data
and relationships necessary for automatic analysis. Therefore, there is not a direct answer
for how the question was first intended and future work in this area is recommended.
On the other hand, from the perspective of an Airworthiness Certification
Official, the generous capabilities of MBSE provide a more automated like insight into
the Airworthiness Analysis than the documented approach in use. Throughout this
research, MBSE has really become a positive approach to airworthiness certification
through use of a model that comprises a coherent and consistent set of interlinked views
that reflect multiple viewpoints of the system. By generating links between the elements,
as a system is updated in a particular area, that update will be automatically reflected
across each view in which that element is included. Furthermore, if a component or piece
of software needs to be updated, the model can generate the impacted portions of the
system through relation mapping that instantly informs users of the affected functions.
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5.3 Recommendations for Action
With the creation of the Airworthiness Certification Profile, it is recommended
that the Air Force take action to begin the implementation of the Profile into the
Airworthiness Certification Process. To begin this transformation, it is recommended that
the Profile be reviewed by the MIL-HDBK-516C Section 15 Airworthiness Certification
Officials and Subject Matter Experts to ensure that each essential portion of the
certification analysis is covered within the profile. Upon acceptance of the Profile, the
Profile will need to be expanded to other Sections of MIL-HDBK-516C. Once each
section of MIL-HDBK-516C is represented and the Profile is standardized, it is
recommended that the Air Force utilize the Profile as an Airworthiness Certification
Document to be issued to all contracted aircraft developers.
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research
Incorporate Rule Verification Coding into the SCF Thread Portion of the
Airworthiness Certification Profile. With the myriad of attributes required for
certification just coming out of Section 15, research could be conducted into a rule
verification tool. This tool would run in the background but provide visual warnings and
recommendations for any portions of the Profile properties that are not being followed.
For example, one major portion of the SCF Thread is the allocation of the Hardware and
Software to the SCF. Although it is common practice in SysML to allocate components
to functions, it may not be known that those components that support an SCF need to be
marked as an SSE. Right now, SysML does not give a confirmation or warning if an SCF
supporting component is marked with this stereotype or not.
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Develop Automation Capabilities within the Airworthiness Certification Profile.
Although MBSE provides continuity between elements and diagrams through
relationship mapping, there is potential for various Airworthiness Analysis that could be
automated through a script generation. One such aspect is with a Report Generator.
Although the model assists in SCF Identification within the system, there are still a lot of
reports needed for the Airworthiness evaluation to include a risk estimate, function
severity, and Compliance Report. As FMET events for software are conducted and
hardware failure rates are identified, risk calculations against the safety of the system
could be generated. Another automation feature within the Profile would be calculating
the severity of a function. Where the identification of an SCF is so important to the safety
of a System, it would be a valuable to have a more automated calculation of the severity
of a function that fails to operate. Finally, the model could provide a way to capture the
information mentioned and all additional evaluation material in a report that is acceptable
by decision makers.
Review of Airworthiness Policy to Identify Redundancy when using MBSE. The
approach of this research was to take pedigreed policy and convert it to a model-based
environment. However, future research could look at the policy itself and pinpoint
redundant information already captured in the model that could simplify the process or
policy being examined. This could include removal of documents, redundant steps, or
unnecessary artifact generation.
Incorporate Other Sections of MIL-HDBK-516C into the Airworthiness
Certification Profile. For an airworthiness certification to be fully completed, each
Section of MIL-HDBK-516C must be reviewed and signed off. This means that each
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Section would need to be researched and the respective analysis and diagrams required to
fulfill the Section Standards would need to be brought into the Profile.
Use of the Airworthiness Certification Profile in other Military and Commercial
Sectors. Research could be conducted into the use of the Airworthiness Certification
Profile for digital models outside of the Air Force Airworthiness Home Office. The
Profile could easily be adapted for commercial aircraft and the incorporation of Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) documents. Additionally, the Profile could be adapted for
the Airworthiness Certifications of Army, Navy, and Marine aircraft as well.
Is using model-based format better than using a document-based format?
Research is needed to determine if replicating a document-based policy by using system
models does make the process better. Perhaps there is something else that needs to
change, whether in the process or automation, to achieve an improved course of action.
Lessons could be learned from application of this model in Airworthiness Certification
pilot projects.
5.5 Summary of Research
The current United States Air Force (USAF) airworthiness certification process,
captured in MIL-HDBK-516C, is time-consuming and manpower intensive due to
extensive documentation. To minimize inefficiencies of this document-based approach,
this thesis examined MBSE to support SCF thread analysis against criteria found in
Section 15 of MIL-HDBK-516C. Within this scope, the research identified an SCF
domain-specific profile and style guide using the SysML and domain specific extensions.
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The Airworthiness Certification Profile is a groundbreaking step forward for
Airworthiness Certification. The Profile created for this research utilized both built in
and tailored domain specific extensions to create modeling aspects and/or program
artifacts within the certification process. The incorporation of a SysML domain specific
digital model into the Airworthiness Certification Process provides significant impact
into various stages of the overall airworthiness analysis. This includes the opportunity for
the Airworthiness Home Office to transfer use of the Artifacts Tool from a documentbased environment into a model-based asset with each portion of the model answering
multiple attributes found in AC-17-01.
Using the Airworthiness Certification Profile has substantial potential in reducing
workloads in the digital transfer of airworthiness certification reporting documentation
between organizations. No longer will there be a need to have a system designer generate
the data to the SPO, have the SPO interpret that data, and then have the SPO translate the
data to a document-based format for airworthiness evaluation. With a digital model, the
system design, with an applied Airworthiness Certification Profile, can directly pass
between the system designer, SPO, and Airworthiness Home Office. Additionally, by
using a Profile, any aircraft developer can incorporate it directly into their MBSE System
Model. This allows the use of the Profile to be placed against any Aircraft Platform and
used with any SPO.
Another aspect of the Airworthiness Certification Profile is its ability to be used
with a new aircraft model or incorporated into an existing model. The Profile is not set up
to change or replace an existing aircraft system model, but instead the relationship
mapping shows the system modeler how to take the elements from the system model and
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place them in separate diagrams used for the Airworthiness Certification process. The
Airworthiness Certification Profile is only built to provide stereotypes and demonstrate
relationship mapping of existing aircraft modeled functions that will then be used as part
of the certification process.
Finally, workload reduction and System clarity occurs in the use of the
verification of compliance to each of the Airworthiness Standards. Digital tables
generated in the Profile are set to match the current airworthiness certification artifacts
tool. This method of compliance requirement diagram is to be used to label each standard
and provide the appropriate diagram and/or artifacts that satisfy the standard. This way,
an Airworthiness Certification Official can not only verify the compliance, but also
review the direct use of the analyzed element throughout the system.
Throughout this research, MBSE has really become a positive approach to
airworthiness certification. With the Airworthiness Certification Profile, a System model
can become undergo various aspects of the safety analysis using a coherent and
consistent set of interlinked views that reflect multiple viewpoints of the system. The use
of this Profile is a true beginning to accomplishing the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) digital engineering strategy. Ultimately, using MBSE for SCF identification and
thread analysis will not only improve airworthiness certification but support the digital
transformation of the Defense acquisition system.
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